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and the first amendment right of free speech with regard to public officials.
The Court held the standard to be one of actual malice, that is, knowledge
that a statement is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. Of course Heit is distinguishable in many respects, primarily
because Congress could presumably legislate a negligence standard if it so
desired without running afoul of the Constitution. Absent congressional
action, however, and in view of the competing policy goals-preventing
fraud without interfering with the flow of corporate information-the
Sullivan line would be an appropriate resolution of the matter. Until then,
sales of corporate executives' liability insurance will probably continue to
60

soar.

RALEIGH A. SHOEMAKER

Securities Regulation-In Pari Delicto as a Defense for a Violation
of Rule Lob-5
In Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,' the plaintiff had become acquainted
through business dealings with the defendant, president of Texstar, and
a personal friendship had soon developed. Over a period of five months,
the defendant continuously supplied the plaintiff with inside information
consisting of assurances of increased stock dividends and proposed profitable business dealings with two major oil companies. Relying primarily
on this confidential information,2 the plaintiff began buying Texstar stock
on margin on the open market. None of the value-enhancing occurrences
ever materialized, and the plaintiff was forced to sell his stock and suffered
a large financial loss.' The federal district court held that the plaintiff was
a tippee under Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 4 and denied
"0Symposiu-Rule 10b-5: Developments in the Law, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 544
(1968) (suggesting that no insurance be allowed corporate executives for intentional or negligent violations of rule lOb-5).
1286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968). On May 9, 1969, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed by a 2-1 decision. - F.2d - (1969).
'Apparently, another reason for Kuehnert's purchases was to help defendant
retain the presidency of the company. Brief for Appellee at 5-9, Kuehnert v.
Texstar Corp., - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1969).
286 F. Supp. at 342-43.
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
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him relief because of his knowledge that he was using inside information.5
When a tippee is a party to the action, he is normally the defendant.
He usually receives information from an insider that is not available to
the general investing public and uses this information to purchase or sell
stock, either directly from a third party, 6 or indirectly on the open
market.7 The stock then increases or decreases in value as expected by
the tippee, and he in turn is sued by the third party who suffered a loss
because of this transaction. The instant case differs from this normal
situation in at least two respects: the inside information received by
Kuehnert was false, and this false information led to substantial losses,
placing the tippee in the position of a plaintiff.
In holding that the plaintiff, as a tippee, could not recover under Rule
10b-5, the court stated that the Rule
cannot be used by such a person to sustain a cause of action for fraud.
It is the ordinary person that buys and sells securities based upon information generally available to the investing public who is protected
by Section 78j (b) of the Act and Rule lOb-5 and not one that has
access to or believes he has access to secret, material, confidential,
corporate information. s
This language would seem to preclude recovery under the Rule by anyone
that has participated in insider trading regardless of the validity of the
information.' Yet, denying recovery to the tippee who has lost money
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or

would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange

Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964), which provides that

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
286 F. Supp. at 345.
'E.g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
'E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
286 F. Supp. at 345.

° It was also argued that because the information was false, it would constitute
a violation of the rule for the tippee to disseminate it to the general public. Brief
for Appellant at 5, Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., - F.2d

-

(5th Cir. 1969).
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in a transaction induced by an insider is seemingly inconsistent with the
trend of imposing civil liability under Rule lOb-5 whenever any false
information given concerning the financial situation of a corporation
results in a loss to the purchaser who relied on this information. In conjunction with potential criminal sanctions and administrative regulations,
the use of Rule lOb-5 to impose civil liability ° on insiders for violation
of the Rule provides an additional deterrent to fraudulent practices in
security transactions.1 1 The holding in this case may thus lessen the
deterrent effect of the Rule by relieving many defendant-insiders from
such liability. This seems particularly true in light of the growing class
of persons who may be considered "tippees.' '1 2 Under the Kuehnert
language, insiders could disseminate false information with relative impunity, for whatever reason, to the large class of traders who are tippees.
The imposition of civil liability under lOb-5 requires three elements
in order to establish a right of recovery, all of which seem to be present
in this case: 1) a purchase by the plaintiff, 2) reliance on misleading
statements made by the defendant, and 3) a financial loss suffered through
this purchase. 3 It seems clear, then, that Kuehnert would have been
allowed to recover, absent the defense permitted by the court. The reason
for denying recovery was unclear, but the court did use the doctrine of
in pari delicto' 4 as an alternative holding. 5 Although the doctrine was
mentioned only briefly in the opinion, its rationale permeates the entire
decision. For example, the court stated that "the tippee such as Kuehnert
must be painted with the same brush and the same color as the insider from
whom the tippee receives his information,""' and that "Rule lOb-5 [was]
" The first instance in which civil liability was imposed under Rule 10b-5 was
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). There have,
apparently, been no subsequent decisions rejecting this innovation, and it has met
with overwhelming acceptance. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259
F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Ind. 1966). See also Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by the FederalSecurities Laws: The Codification Implications of Texas Gulf

Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 872 (1967).
1 See

Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953): "[N]othing ...

would tend more... to deter fraudulent practices in security transactions ... than
the right of defrauded sellers or buyers . . . to seek redress in damages in federal

courts."
" See A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.4, at 76 & n.33.1 (1967).
1" Posner, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation, 22 Bus. LAW. 645,
654 (1967).
1

For different applications of this doctrine, compare Hall v. Corcoran, 107

Mass. 251 (1871), with Whelden v. Chappel, 8 R.I. 230 (1865).
" "Alternatively, the defense of in pari delicto asserted by the defendants is good
as against Kuehnert, although because of the above holding no further discussion
of that doctrine and its applicability here is necessary." 286 F. Supp. at 345.
16 Id.
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not intended to be and cannot be used by such a person to sustain a cause
of action for fraud."' 7 These passages seem to reiterate the policy of the
in pari delicto doctrine-that someone who is at fault will be precluded
from recovery from another party at fault, even if the other party may
be more blameworthy.'

8

In using this language, the court may have felt that if the plaintiff himself were found to be a violator of the Rule, denying him recovery might be
an effective deterrent to people who find themselves in the position of
the tippee in the future. Since there could be no possibility of recovery
from anyone in the event the insider information was incorrect, the
tippee would theoretically refrain from trading on any inside information.
Another possibility left open by the court's language is that a balancing
test could be used to determine whether a particular tippee would be
allowed to recover based on the comparative guilt in each individual case.
But the judicial imposition of civil liability under the Rule has eliminated
the necessity of proving all the required elements"8 of common law fraud,2"
and it is arguable that to preserve the overall deterrent effect of permitting
civil recovery under Rule 10b-5, the Rule should also preclude the equitable
defense of in pari delicto under any circumstances.
Traditionally the concepts inherent in in pari- delicto were used in
litigation involving private parties, where public regulation was not
involved. When private litigants have been given a significant role in
furthering public aims, as is evidenced by the civil remedy in connection
with criminal sanctions for a violation of the Securities Exchange Act,
sound arguments exist for limiting the scope of equitable defenses. 2 ' An
illustrative analogy 2 is found in recent antitrust litigation. 3 The Supreme
Court of the United States eliminated the doctrine of in pari delicto as a
Id.
See, e.g., Note, It PariDelicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust
Suits, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1241 (1965).
'"The common law elements of fraud are: (1) a false representatation, (2) of
a material fact, (3) made with knowledge of its falsity, and (4) with intent to
deceive, (5) which representation is relied upon by plaintiff, (6) resulting in
damage to him. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 100, 104, at 700, 736 (3d ed. 1964).
"0E.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 831 (D. Del. 1951).
" Cf. Note, In PariDelicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits,
78 HARV. L. Rnv. 1241, 1241-42 (1965).
2 The following analogy has been drawn between these two fields. "Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action.
As in antitrust treble damage litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunc3.7
1'

tive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy requirements." J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
" Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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defense to a civil action for an antitrust violation under both Section 1
of the Sherman Act 24 and Section 3 of the Clayton Act. 5 The court concluded that the public policy of permitting civil recovery as an additional
deterrent for a violation of the antitrust laws was paramount to the
equitable doctrine of in pari delicto.
It would appear also that the overriding interest of maintaining the
integrity of the securities exchange can probably be best achieved by
preventing fraud at its source. Admittedly, an individual plaintiff may be
allowed to recover when his actions have been just as blameworthy as the
defendant's, but the limited number of situations in which the plaintiff
might be equally blameworthy would not seem to justify the administrative
costs and burdens of allowing the defendant to prove that the equities are
in his favor in a particular case.
Permitting equitable defenses also appears inconsistent with developing trends of lOb-5 enforcement, and in fact with the purpose of the Rule
itself, which was designed in large part to protect the integrity of stock
transactions2" by deterring the misconduct of insiders."' Judicial attempts
to eliminate misconduct by facilitating recovery for a violation of the
Rule are evidenced by the steady liberalizing of its requirements: the
common law elements of fraud do not have to be proved,," the requirement
of privity has been emasculated, 29 and the concept of who may qualify as
an "insider" subject to the Rule is expanding.8" These trends all serve
to discourage securities fraud, and allowing equitable defenses for the
initiator of the false information could serve to weaken any such deterrent effect. Further, by holding that the Rule was not intended to
protect one "that has access to or believes he has access to secret, material,
confidential, corporate information,"'" the court arguably reads out that
part of the Rule that states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person...
to make any untrue statement . . . in connection with the purchase or
" 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
'o Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
's

List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965).
Posner, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation, 22 Bus.

LAW.

654 (1967).

645,

" Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities Laws: The
Codification Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 872, 892-96

(1967).
"oE.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
" 286 F. Supp. at 345.
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sale of any security."" It seems unlikely that the court could have intended to weaken so substantially such a significant part of the Rule, but
at least insofar as the civil remedy is concerned the effect of its language
could have this result.
In denying the plaintiff the use of the Rule in this case, the court
does not employ all the potential deterrent force it has available. All the
court requires in order to bar a plaintiff from recovery under the Rule is
that he believe that he is using some secret information.33 A different
result in this case would have the effect of reducing the number of
initial false statements, and recovery would not be dependent on the later
actions of the one who received the information. The subsequent action
by the plaintiff does not lessen the evil of giving false statements in the
first place, and should not relieve the defendant of any liability, either civil
or criminal. In short, the subjective intent of the tippee should not lessen
the responsibility of an instigator who has clearly violated the Act himself.
ALEXANDER P. SANDS, III

Torts-Liability of Builder-Vendor's Lender for Failure to Protect
Vendee against Defective Home
In Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan Association,1 the California Supreme Court held that a lender who provided financing for a
subdeveloper had a duty to purchasers to exercise reasonable care to prevent the builder from constructing and selling defective houses. The subdeveloper was inexperienced and undercapitalized, and its lender retained
substantial control over the subdevelopment planning almost to the point
of being an entrepreneur without sharing attendant risks. Connor is a
decision without precedent,2 and it pioneers a new area in a field that was
already in a great state of flux-tort liability in the home-building in02 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
286 F. Supp. at 345.
Cal. 2d -, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (Traynor, C.J., in a 4-3
decision).
' The intermediate appellate court did reach almost the same result, however,
in holding that Great Western owed purchasers of housing built by the subdeveloper
a duty "at least to the extent of protecting these persons from gross structural
hazards." Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 253 Cal. App. 2d -,

333, 344 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).

-,

61 Cal. Rptr.

